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TOO MUCH FOR A NATION TO BEAR: QUESTIONS
OF SUSTAINABILITY AND CONSULTATION IN
ENVIRONMENTAL REVIEWS; THE CASE OF THE
TULSEQUAH CHIEF MINE
ANNA J. PUGH†

ABSTRACT
This case comment questions the neutrality of government environmental assessment reviews in Canada, through an examination of the
proposed Tulsequah Chief Mine in Northern BC. The author questions
whether a government which openly promotes development can or will
ever place sustainability of a region on an equal level with economic
gains. In the case of the Tulsequah Chief mine, the Taku River Tlingit
First Nation opposes the project on grounds of regional sustainability.
The litigation between the Tlingits, the BC Government and the Redfern
Mining Corporation has raised issues regarding the ﬁduciary duty of
governments to considering the claims of ﬁrst peoples as part of the determination of sustainability for a region. Current government policies
of ignoring cries for land claim settlements, while supporting incomplete development proposals, run contrary to the recommendations of
the 1977 Berger Report of the MacKenzie Valley Pipeline Inquiry. The
author compares the costly, negative effects of hasty mine approvals
to date, versus the commitment to sustainability demonstrated by settling land claims and working with remote ﬁrst nations as development
partners. The author concludes that communities who will be affected
by development must be able to accommodate the changes that development will bring.

†

The author is a third year student at Dalhousie University. This is her second published comment in the Dalhousie Journal of Legal Studies discussing issues of Aboriginal and Environmental Law. Ms. Pugh will be returning to her home in the Yukon Territory to article and to
practice law.
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DOES CONSULTATION PROVIDE THE POWER TO HALT PROJECT
DEVELOPMENT?
Our history has shown, unfortunately all too well, that Canadaʼ’s
Aboriginal peoples are justiﬁed in worrying about government
objectives that may be superﬁcially neutral but which constitute de
facto threats to the existence of Aboriginal rights and interests.1

In March of 2004, the Supreme Court of Canada SCC) will hear arguments by the Province of British Columbia in the matter of the Taku
River Tlingit v. Tulsequah Chief Mine Project.2 Through a process initiated by a lengthy environmental review, and extended by even lengthier
litigation, the SCC will have the opportunity to render a decision on a
matter of extreme importance to a First Nationʼ’s people prior to the
development of a proposed project that stands to have immense impact
on their way of life. Given that all too often such issues are considered
only after development or policies have already been implemented, the
Court is in a unique position to provide a remedy beyond the platitudes
that are often the only result of a courtʼ’s conﬁrmation of Aboriginal
rights.
The Supreme Court will review the issue of whether governments
have a duty to consult First Nations with respect to environmental assessments in instances where no rights under section 35 of the Constitution Act have been established over the region in question, and where
no treaties or land claims have been signed.3 Underlying the issue of
consultation is the larger issue of what consultation really means in the
context of the Canadian Environmental Assessment (EA) process, and
whether the consultation process provides the public, particularly First
Nations, any power to halt the development of proposed projects.
The manner in which projects are assessed in British Columbia and
other parts of Canada has been improving with respect to the dissemination of information to the public, and possibly through the institution
of enhanced controls over the mitigation of adverse impacts resulting
from project development. However, at a fundamental level, the assess1

R. v. Sparrow, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1075, [1990] S.C.J. No. 49 at para. 64.
Taku River Tlingit First Nation v. Tulsequah Chief Mine Project, [2000] B.C.J. No.1301 (QL),
2000 BCSC 1001; affʼ’d but varied [2002] B.C.J. No. 155 (QL), 2002 BCCA 59, leave to appeal
to S.C.C. requested, [Taku River (chambers) and Taku River (appeal), respectively].
3
Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11.
2

TOO MUCH FOR A NATION . . . 213

ment and consultation process continues to be fatally ﬂawed and biased
toward industry and development to the detriment of the overall sustainability of the Canadian environment. In allowing for a consultation
process that does not seem willing to contemplate the refusal of certiﬁcation of a proposed project, the neutrality of the assessment process is
compromised and the meaning of consultation rings hollow.
Through an examination of the Tulsequah Chief Project, it becomes
clear that current federal and provincial environmental assessment processes are driven by the premise that projects should be approved, provided that certain conditions are met. Such a premise does not seek to
inquire whether a project is appropriate for a region or an ecosystem;
rather, it presumes that any and all concerns can be mitigated somewhere
down the road. If governments operate the assessment process with this
level of deference to the viability of the project, consultation becomes,
in effect, a way to identify concerns which may need to be mitigated,
but not a way to review whether a project should proceed at all.
The implication of this approach to assessment is that consultations
bear more resemblance to disseminations of project information rather
than an opportunity to review a project from a perspective that considers
sustainability on par with other factors, as is mandated by provincial and
federal environmental assessment legislation. Such meaningless consultation undermines the very purpose of an environmental review.
The Tulsequah Chief Mine is a recent, well-documented example of
the fundamental error of treating consultation, particularly with respect
to regional sustainability, as less weighty than other review standards.
If the notion of sustainability is to continue as a hallmark of Canadian
environmental assessment processes, governments must view meaningful consultation as an essential part of the review process.

THE TULSEQUAH CHIEF PROJECT
1. Location
The Tulsequah Chief mine site is located in the northwestern corner of
British Columbia in the Taku River watershed. The Taku empties into
the Paciﬁc Ocean near Juneau, Alaska, approximately sixty-ﬁve kilom-
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eters (km) south of the mine.4 The watershed itself covers 18,000 square
kilometers. Presently, there are no roads within the entire watershed
with the exception of a small segment of the Golden Bear mine road in
the southernmost portion of the area.5 The watershed has been described
by many, including both the British Columbia Supreme Court (BCSC)
and the British Columbia Court of Appeal (BCCA), as “pristine.”6
2. History
The mine site itself is situated on a massive sulphide deposit originally discovered in 1927.7 The site was developed in the early 1950s by
Cominco Ltd. (now known as Teck Cominco). Cominco operated the
Tulsequah Chief Mine for six years from 1951 to 1957. Gold ore was
processed at a rate of approximately 450 tonnes per day. The ore was
barged from the mine site to Juneau via the Taku River.8 The only access
to the mine was, and still is, by air or water.
Cominco abandoned the mine in 1957. At that time, reclamation
or site remediation were neither required nor expected for mining activities. However, the process used to separate the ore resulted in the
creation of tailing sites, from which acid mine drainage (AMD) seeped
into the Tulsequah River.9 Cominco, who still owned the mine property, was issued a pollution abatement order in 1989 when the AMD was
discovered. Instead of mitigating the problem as required by the order, Cominco prepared a rehabilitation plan (resulting in a rescission of
the order), and shortly thereafter sold the property to Redcorp Ventures
Ltd., the parent company of Redfern Resources. Redcorp was then is4

Tom L. Green, “Evaluating Mining and its Effects on Sustainability: the case of the Tulsequah
Chief Mine” (A Report Prepared for the Environmental Mining Council of British Columbia,
July 28, 2001) at 4. [Peer-reviewed but unpublished].
5
Ibid.
6
Supra note 2.
7
C. Sebert & T.J. Barrett, “Stratigraphy, alteration, and mineralization at the Tulsequah Chief
massive sulphide deposit, northwestern BC” (excerpt from Exploration and Mining Geology,
v.5, p.281-308, 1996) online: Ore Systems Consulting <http://www.oresystems.com/global/
tulsequahjourn.html>.
8
Taku River (chambers), supra note 2 at 6.
9
Environmental Mining Council of British Columbia, “Acid-Generating Mining Sites in Canada, 2003” online: Environmental Mining Council of British Columbia <http://emcbc.miningwatch.org/emcbc/mapping/amd_canada.htm>.
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sued a pollution abatement order, but this was deferred in anticipation of
a full environmental review of Redcorpʼ’s proposal to reopen the mine.10
Redcorpʼ’s proposal included a rehabilitation plan for the historic tailings and AMD.11
3. Redfernʼ’s Plan
As the new owner of the Tulsequah Chief property, Redfern Resources12
proposes to reopen the mine with substantially higher daily production
rates, a longer life-span and increased job opportunities through the
construction, production and decommissioning phases of the mine.
Redfernʼ’s proposal is to mine approximately 2,500 tonnes of ore
concentrate per day.13 At the time of Comincoʼ’s work on the mine,
the daily ore mined was closer to 450 tonnes. The substantial increase
in tonnage and concern for disruption within the salmon-bearing Taku
River makes the transport of ore by barge less feasible and less desirable
from the perspective of most of the interested parties. Instead, Redfern
proposed to build a single-lane, gravel road between the mine site and
Atlin, B.C., a town 160 km north of the mine. The proposal involves restricting the road to mine operations only by use of a twenty-four hour,
monitored gate.14
From Atlin, the ore trucks will then travel a further eighty km along
the Atlin Road, a dirt and gravel road connecting the isolated town with
the Alaska Highway in the Yukon Territory. The ore will be transported
seventy-ﬁve km along the Alaska Highway into the Yukon Territory,
and then 160 km on the South Klondike Highway to the port town of

10

Green, supra note 4 at 5-6.
Supra note 2, appeal judgment, Appendix B, Schedule A.
12
While Redcorp Resources is the parent company who actually purchased the mine property
from Cominco, it is junior mining company Redfern Resources who has proposed the project
and undergone the environmental assessment process. Therefore, Redfern will be referred to as
owner and proponent of the Tulsequah Chief Project within the remainder of this paper.
13
Taku River (chambers), supra note 2 at 2.
14
See Redfern Project Report, infra note 45; Green, supra note 4; Lindsay Staples, “Determining the Impact of the Tulsequah Chief Mine Project on the Traditional Land Use of the Taku
River First Nation,” (A Report prepared for the Environmental Assessment Ofﬁce, Province of
British Columbia, August, 1997) [unpublished].
11
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Skagway, Alaska.15 Beyond the construction of the 160 km access road,
the Atlin Road will also require substantial upgrading involving improvement of the road surface in order to accommodate the weight and
frequency of the ore trucks.16
4. Quantities and Economics
Redfern Resources predicts that the mine would be redeveloped as a
“medium-sized underground operation processing up to 900,000 metric
tonnes (1 million tons) of ore per year.”17 A potential exists for the mine
to be expanded and developed further as it deepens and new access
routes are created. On top of the life-span of the mine, there would be
an additional two years of pre-production development involving the set
up of on-site infrastructure and road-building.	

    18
An estimated 700,000 person hours of employment would be created annually through the project. This translates into a construction
work force of close to 400 during the construction phase, and approximately 200 on-site employees during the operations phase.19 Redfern
anticipates that the available jobs will be ﬁlled by workers from Atlin,
the Yukon, and elsewhere in British Columbia. The Taku River Tlingit
First Nation (TRTFN) may make up ten percent, or twenty jobs, within
this workforce.20 Overall, the Staples Report provided to the British
Columbia Environmental Assessment Ofﬁce suggests that as many as
600 direct, indirect, and induced employment opportunities may be created through the mine. Such estimates are questionable; Green notes
that within a project of relatively short time frame such as this, these
15

“Exploration in B.C. 1996” (Publication of BC Ministry of Energy and Mines) online: Ministry Programs and Services.
<http://www.em.gov.bc.ca/Mining/Geolsurv/Publications/expl_bc/1996/northWest05.htm>.
16
This portion of the proposal has caused concerns for Yukoners, as well. See Adam Killick,
“Atlin Mine may cost Yukon Big Bucks” Yukon News (20 March, 1998). The cost of the upgrading may be in the range of $14 million.
17
Statement of Terence E. Chandler, President, CEO and Director, Redfern Resources Limited, (Witness Statement to the US House of Representatives Committee on Resources, May
23, 2000) online: Committee on Resources <http://resourcescommittee.house.gov/106cong/
fullcomm/00may23/chandler.htm>.
18
Ibid.
19
Green, supra note 4 at 6.
20
Staples, supra note 14.
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estimates tend to be higher than what may actually be viable.21 Particularly where training or skills are required, it is not clear that within the
available workforce of the TRTFN, or even within the numbers of unemployed in northern B.C. and the Yukon, such skills already exist. No
estimates for training, in terms of time or cost, appear to be included in
the employment projections.
The numbers cited by Redfern for employment ﬁgures and projected
incomes from taxation and indirect business creation are questionable to
some extent; however, it is clear that the mine would create a substantial
number of jobs and would contribute signiﬁcantly to the economy of
Atlin. What is less clear is whether such a contribution is necessary or
desirable for such a remote area where many residents may ascribe less
value to proﬁts and monetary gains. There is evidence from public consultation and the current tourism-based industry in the Atlin area that
locals may place a higher value on current attributes of the Atlin region,
such as social and cultural considerations, sustainability of the regionʼ’s
wilderness, strong ﬁsh and animal populations, biological diversity and
low human density than on economic considerations. Concerns have
been raised in this regard by the TRTFN.
The concerns noted by the TRTFN are not new, and they echo sentiments of other First Nations in northern Canada as far back as 1977 during the Berger Inquiry into the proposed MacKenzie Gas Pipeline:
Any major development that has taken place in the North has been
of a rapid nature. Their [white peopleʼ’s] only purpose in coming
here is to extract the non-renewable resources, not to the beneﬁt of
northerners, but of …southern Canadians and Americans. [I]t does
not leave any permanent jobs for people who make the North their
home…they also impose on the northern people their white culture
and all its value systems, which leaves nothing to the people who
have been living off the land for thousands of years.22

Such sentiments are clearly not unique; indeed, they form the crux of
the argument for recognizing sustainability as a key factor in the environmental assessment process. But in the thirty-ﬁve years since the
21

Green, supra note 4 at 52.
Justice Thomas R. Berger, Northern Frontier Northern Homeland: The Report of the MacKenzie Valley Pipeline Inquiry, vol. 1.(Minister of Supply and Services Canada, 1977) at 36
[Berger Inquiry].

22
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Berger Inquiry, governments are still unwilling or unable to give such
sentiments the consideration they are due.

THE POSITION OF THE TRTFN
1. Background
Historically, the Taku River Tlingit (TRT) were known as the Takuquan,
one of fourteen Tlingit clans based on the southeastern Alaskan Coast.
The TRT are closely associated culturally, geographically and familially
with Teslin Tlingit and Carcross-Tagish – two Inland Tlingit Nations
with communities located predominantly in the Yukon.23 The Taku
River Tlingit First Nation identify a traditional territory which spans
much of the northwestern corner of British Columbia, as well as southern portions of the Yukon and parts of southeastern Alaska. Of the approximately 300 Taku River Tlingit people, close to half live within
the Atlin area.24 Many of the TRTFN who do not reside in Atlin live in
Whitehorse and still closely identify the Atlin area as being culturally
and personally important. Studies indicate that many TRTFN living away
from Atlin do so because of economic or social necessity.25 Examples
of this include families with teenaged children moving to Whitehorse so
the children can attend high school, or elders who move in order to be
closer to medical resources such as continuing care homes and hospital
facilities.
As noted by Staples, the relationships between the Inland Tlingit
in B.C. and the Yukon have been complicated by the imposition of the
B.C.-Yukon border and the subsequent creation of two different systems
of governance within which the Inland Tlingit people must now operate. Over the past two decades, differential treatment of First Nations
on the border has increased due to the successful efforts of the federal
government to recognize land claims and allow for self-governance in
the Yukon, while the British Columbia and federal governments have
23

Staples, supra note 14 at 4.3.
Staples, supra note 14 at 4.3.
25
Staples, supra note 14 at 4.3.
26
Staples, supra note 14 at 4.3.
24
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shown reluctance and imposed delays in implementing a land claims
and treaty process in the province.26
2. Traditional Uses of the Region
While the Taku River Tlingit are no longer entirely reliant on hunting,
harvesting and gathering, reports and personal testimonies indicate that
members of the TRTFN, whether resident or non-resident in Atlin, continue to pursue these traditional activities.27
In a study of twenty-two TRTFN households, only three indicated that
they did not participate in annual harvesting activities in the Atlin area.28
Staples characterizes the interplay between the cash economy and harvesting activities in terms of economics as:
[A] sector that can be severed from the bush sector only with great
practical and analytical difﬁculty. To do so diminishes the strategies
of mutual aid and social and economic cooperation which tie the
two together and which make TRT traditional land use the social and
economic bedrock of the TRT economy.29

One of the primary resources harvested by the TRTFN is salmon from the
Taku River. Such harvesting occurs throughout the summer, beginning
with the king (or spring) salmon runs in June and July. The main sockeye salmon run occurs in July and August. This run provides both subsistence and commercial harvesting to the TRTFN economy.	

    30 The mine
site is located in close proximity to the source waters of the Taku River,
creating a potential threat to the largest salmon run north of the Skeena
River.31
Also of dietary and cultural signiﬁcance are moose and caribou.
While it is noted by Staples that moose comprise the majority of the
TRTFN subsistence diet, this belies the historical importance of caribou
to the TRTFN and the trans-boundary efforts to recover populations of
27

Staples, supra note 14 at 4.3.
Staples, supra note 14 at 4.3.
29
Staples, supra note 14 at 4.3.
30
Salmon are a vital part of the TRTFN diet, second in kilogram consumption to moose, at
seventy kg per household per year, out of approximately 296 kg per household per year. See
e.g. Staples.
31
Green, supra note 4 at 4.
28
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caribou in the Taku River watershed region.	

     32 The TRTFN and caribou
biologists are concerned that the incursion of the Tulsequah Chief road
into prime habitat for the caribou may reverse what is seen by many as
a fragile, yet thus far successful, process of bringing the herd back to
sustainable levels.33
3. Sustainability and Continuity
It is clear from studies, starting with the Berger Inquiry34 and leading
up to work with the Southern Lakes, Rancheria, Finlayson, Fortymile
and Porcupine-Caribou herds in the Yukon, that there is a correlation
between road networks and disruption of caribou migration patterns.35
It is also clear that where roads and development increase access to an
area, traditional activities and reliance on land-based food sources drop,
to the detriment of the health and economic viability of small, predominantly Native communities.36
Such a ﬁnding does not suggest that development in First Nationsʼ’
traditional territories should not occur, but that it should occur with the
endorsement of those affected, and at a pace which allows the First Nation to have infrastructure in place to both preserve a way of life for
future generations and to beneﬁt from the effects the community will
experience. As noted in the Berger report, if development occurs before
native claims are settled:
[T]he communities that are already struggling with the negative
effects of industrial development will be still further demoralized.
To the extent that the process of marginalization – the sense of being
made irrelevant in your own land – is a principal cause of social

32

The construction of the Alaska Highway in the 1940s led to unprecedented levels of over
hunting and massive kills of caribou from the southern Yukon and northern B.C. The Yukon
currently has a program underway to restore populations of caribou to the northwestern B.C./
Southern Lakes area of the Yukon. Therefore, while currently not of signiﬁcance to the TRTFN
diet, caribou are considered culturally signiﬁcant to the TRTFN.
33
Concerns of the Southern Lakes Caribou Recovery Program in Killick, supra note 16.
34
Supra note 22.
35
See, e.g. Theresa Earle, “Thresholds and Caribou” (Your Yukon newsletter, column 322) online: <http://www.taiga.net/yourYukon/col322.html>.
36
Supra note 22 at 148 “The Fort Simpson Experience”.
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pathology, the native people will suffer its effects in ever greater
measure.37

The chief recommendation of the Berger inquiry was that in order to
avoid this social pathology, credence must be given to the concerns
raised by First Nations communities with respect to the rate of development and the impacts that it may have.38 The Canadian Environmental
Assessment Act purports to provide an avenue for reviewing such concerns through the commitment to sustainability as a key focus of the assessment process. However, time and again, discussions of the impacts
a project may have on the sustainability of a region and its people fall
short of consideration of sustainability as an equal to economics. As
such, the purported neutrality of the assessment process resembles a
rubber-stamping procedure in favour of project proponents rather than
an unbiased review of all the information at hand.

THE ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT PROCESS
1. The Committee
In 1994, Redfern Resources initiated an environmental review under
the Mine Development Assessment Process, British Columbia (MDAP).39
Simultaneously, the project also began the screening process of the
Canadian Environmental Assessment Act (CEAA).40 British Columbia
passed its Environmental Assessment Act (BCEAA) in 1996, which then
removed the process from MDAP, and placed the project proposal under
the BCEAA.41

37

Supra note 22 at 194.
Supra note 22.
39
Redfern Resources Ltd. “Tulsequah Project” (2003 Environmental Assessment Update) online: Redfern Resources Ltd. – Ofﬁcial Website <http://www.redfern.bc.ca/projects/tulsequah/
permitting.html>
40
S.C. 1992, c.37. [CEAA].
41
S.B.C. 2002, c. 43. At the time of the Environmental Assessment of the Redfern Project Proposal, the Act in Force was the Environmental Assessment Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 119. However,
the certiﬁcate approval process under the two acts remains substantially similar. [BCEAA].
38
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Under the BCEAA, a major project such as the Tulsequah Chief Proposal is reviewed in order to receive a Certiﬁcate of Project Approval.42
The federal Environmental Assessment Act is subsumed by the BCEAA
due to an initiative on the part of the two governments to streamline
assessment processes into one large-scale assessment.43 In the case of
the Tulsequah Chief Mine, the British Columbia Environmental Assessment Ofﬁce (EAO) convened a Project Committee to review the proposed
reopening of the mine.
The Committee was established in accordance with section 30(1) of
the BCEAA in force at the time. The purpose of the Committee, as noted
by Kirkpatrick J., was to provide advice and recommendations to the
executive director (at the time, Norm Ringstad) and the Minister of the
Environment. Originally, the Committee was intended to review the information provided by Redfern as the project proponent. However, as
the environmental review continued onward, it is clear from the records
that the Project Committee ultimately played a far larger role in the
creation of reports, dissemination of information, and the overall scope
and parameters of the proposed project.44
2. The Reports
Redfern Resources provided its initial project study report in November
of 1996.45 Initially, the TRTFN had agreed in principle to assist the proponent in the compilation of data, including use of maps and imagery,
42

Ibid. s. 17(3).
CEAA, supra note 40, s.54. However, subsequent to the court decisions and ongoing litigation with respect to the Tulsequah Chief Project, the CEAA has been restarted. The Department
of Indian and Northern Affairs (DIAND) has stated: “Currently, DFO and DIAND are waiting for a response to deﬁciencies from the proponent. At this point DFO and DIAND assume
the review will be “de-harmonized” with independent decisions by the Federal and Provincial
Governments.” (CEAA Level II Projects – Yukon Region, October 2002) online: <http://www.
ainc-inac.gc.ca/yt/ceaa2_e.html>.
44
See Taku River (chambers), supra note 2 at 115. Though the Court declined to ﬁnd a reasonable apprehension of bias in this process, Kirkpatrick J. did recognize that members of the
Project Committee (including employees of the B.C. Government) did engage in improving and
submitting mitigation proposals to the rest of the Committee.
45
This report will be referred to as the Redfern Project Report. The report is no longer made
available by the proponent or the B.C. EAO. Therefore, any reference to this report is in the
context of references made by the authors of other reports and commentary, as well as the judgments in the B.C. courts.
43
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already completed in anticipation of ongoing land claim negotiations
with the British Columbia government. However, the TRTFN entered into
this endeavour with clear concerns about the impacts a road could have
on their traditional territory and uses of the land, as well as adverse effects on wildlife and ﬁsheries in the region. With that in mind, the TRTFN
requested that further studies be undertaken in order to develop a better
sense of the magnitude of the impacts the area might experience. Further, the First Nation asked that the project be assessed by the proponent
in terms of sustainability of the cultural and economic interests that the
TRTFN had in the area.
The TRTFN claim that such an in-depth analysis, though necessary in
order to complete a full impact review, was not undertaken by the proponent. When this deﬁciency was perceived, the TRTFN partially withdrew
from the process with the proponent and requested that their position
with respect to the Review Committee be upgraded from that of an observer to a Committee member. The TRTFN stated that they were placed
in, “an awkward position – we were being asked by the company to
support a project for which we had no meaningful understanding of its
signiﬁcance to our people.”46 In other words, the TRTFN did not receive
meaningful consultation by the proponent in its environmental impact
assessment, and the First Nation now wanted to fully join the consultation process of the government as well.
Gaining a place on the Committee allowed the TRTFN to have a direct
voice. It is worth noting, too, that in placing the TRTFN on the Project
Committee, the British Columbia Government implicitly recognized its
duty to consult the TRTFN above and beyond the consultations with the
proponent. As members of the Project Committee, the TRTFN raised its
continuing concern that the Redfern Project Report failed to adequately
address its questions and concerns. In response, the EAO also tendered
a review with a contractor agreed to by the TRTFN of the social, cultural,
economic, and environmental issues.47 The report that was borne out of
this second review process, the Staples Report, appears to align itself
much more closely with the issues surrounding the adverse impacts of
the mine on sustainability of the region in respect of the TRTFN interests
in the traditional and cultural values of the land.
46
47

Staples, supra note 14 (introduction).
Taku River (chambers), supra note 2 at 59.
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It was the position of the TRTFN that, upon completion of the ﬁrst
Staples report but prior to its review, the First Nation was, “sufﬁciently
aware of its design and direction to give it support as meeting the report
speciﬁcations,” and that they hoped, “readers, in their pursuit of a better
and more holistic understanding of the project, will treat [it] as the substantive assessment of impacts to our people.” The TRTFN also expressed
hope that, “Redfern too, despite its initial antagonism to this study, will
view it as the legitimate expression of concerns that Taku Tlingit people
have with respect to the Tulsequah Chief Project.”48
Ultimately, however, the TRTFN did not feel that the Staples Report
responded to all the concerns they had raised, and the government contracted again to receive an addendum to the Staples Report that thoroughly canvassed the concerns the Tlingit had raised.49 By the end of the
report generating process, the Project Committee had in its possession
the Redfern Project Report, an Addendum to this report, the Staples
report, the Staples Addendum, and an earlier, initial report prepared before the Project Committee was struck.
From this information, the EAO, as a member of the Project Committee, compiled a Recommendations Report to submit to the Minister for
ﬁnal determination of the certiﬁcate approval. While the Recommendations Report listed the group members, including the TRTFN, the Report
itself failed to ever use the term “sustainability” and did not clearly
iterate the concerns articulated by both the TRTFN and the governmentcontracted Staples Report.50 It further failed to elaborate on the concerns
raised by the United States with respect to trans-boundary issues, including the threat by Governor Tony Knowles to refer the proposal to the
International Joint Commission.51 The Project Committee did not meet
48

Supra note 46.
Lindsay Staples, “Determining the Impact of the Tulsequah Chief Mine Project on the Traditional Land Use of the Taku River Tlingit First Nation,” (A Report Prepared for the Environmental Assessment Ofﬁce, Province of British Columbia, December, 1997) [unpublished]
[Staples Addendum].
50
Finding of Kirkpatrick J., Taku River (chambers), supra note 2 at 58.
51
Ofﬁce of the Governor, “Alaskans Meet with Canadians on Tulsequah Chief Mine: Joint
Watershed Planning, Protecting the Taku River Fishery on Agenda” (Press Release, Alaska Department of Fish and Game, June 12, 2000) online: Alaska Department of Fish and Game
<http://www.state.ak.us/adfg/geninfo/press/2000/6-12gov.htm>. Given the concerns with respect to impacts on the salmon ﬁshery, the Alaskan Governor had suggested a referral to the IJC
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after the submission of the Staples Addendum in December of 1997. On
March 2nd, 1998 the EAO announced the release of the Recommendations
Report for review by the Project Committee, and gave a forty-eight hour
time frame for comment. The report was submitted to the Minister on
March 4, 1998 with a recommendation that the certiﬁcate be approved.
The report provided all the prior reports as backgrounders, but did not
go into detail with respect to the issues.
3. The Issue of the Certiﬁcate
It was the position of the TRTFN that while consultation had occurred, the
termination of the review process made such consultation incomplete.
The TRTFN claimed that submission of a Recommendations Report, which
was unrepresentative of the concerns raised through the consultation,
rendered the consultation process meaningless. Tony Pearse, who represented the TRTFN at Project Committee meetings, noted this perceived
lack of representation in a letter to Norm Ringstad of the EAO:
How can the Project Committee, which has not ever met to deliberate on the results of all the work undertaken by the various subcommittees, complete its job properly when you allow only two days for review
of a draft report the contents of which nobody has seen…There are, to
my latest count, a number of issues still outstanding that are key to the
viability of the project…The precedent being set here for the integrity
of subsequent reviews is extremely dangerous. If the Project Committee
never meets to discuss the review results and formulate a recommendation, what is the point of having one? How does this meet the stated
intentions of the Environmental Assessment Act?52
The EAO record indicates that there was never a response to this
query. In the face of this lack of response, the TRTFN submitted its own
recommendations report with a summary of its stance on the issue: “the
right recommendation is to reject the proposed project as being premature and too beset with information inadequacies, undetermined but
signiﬁcant environmental risk and naïve optimism about future management capacity. We so recommend.”53
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That the TRTFN was compelled to enter its own Recommendations
Report in order to have its concerns included demonstrates the point at
which this consultation process went wrong. The following was noted
by the BCSC:
The Tlingits do not argue that the sustainability of the Tlingits is the
sole factor to be considered…The Tlingitsʼ’ point is that it is a factor that
could not be ignored in the circumstances of this case. When the Tlingits
called for more analysis, it was in the context of their argument that the
issue of sustainability was not addressed either expressly, thoroughly, or
in an integrated way by the Project Committee or in the Recommendations Report…The Tlingits thus argue that these were circumstances
which the Ministers could not ignore.54
In its neglect of the issue of sustainability within the Recommendations Report to the Minister, the EAO committed the error discussed in
the introduction to this paper: it did not demonstrate, through its actions,
that the EAO provides a process that is neutral, nor did it demonstrate a
consideration of all factors enumerated under sections 2(a) and (b) of
the 1996 Environmental Assessment Act, which reads:55
2. The purposes of this Act are (a) to promote sustainability by
protecting the environment and fostering a sound economy and
social well-being, (b) to provide for the thorough, timely and
integrated assessment of the environmental, economic, social,
cultural, heritage and health effects of reviewable projects.

Upon receipt of the Recommendations Report, the Minister issued the
Certiﬁcate of Project Approval to Redfern Resources within two weeks,
with no written reasoning beyond three brief paragraphs.56 This decision
was met with outrage from the TRTFN and many non-Native citizens of
Atlin. Concerns were also expressed by the State of Alaska and various
environmental groups. The TRTFN then applied to the BCSC for a judicial
review of the environmental review process and issue of the Project Approval Certiﬁcate, pursuant to the Judicial Review Procedure Act.57
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THE LITIGATION
1. British Columbia Chambers – Justice Kirkpatrick
The litigation of this matter proceeded ﬁrst in the form of a Chambers
hearing before Justice Kirkpatrick. The ten-day hearing resulted in the
Ministersʼ’ decision being quashed and the matter being referred back
to the Ministers for reconsideration after a revised Project Committee
Report was submitted. While this was not the totality of the relief requested by the TRTFN,58 the judgment did explicitly recognize the failure
of the ﬁnal stages of the Environmental Assessment Process – that of
the formalization of the Recommendations Report, absent mention of
sustainability and Tlingit perspectives, and the extraordinarily rapid decision of the Ministers upon receipt of the Report.59 Justice Kirkpatrick
stopped short of stating that “the entire process has been compromised
or tainted,” but condemned the seemingly low value placed on the concerns of the Tlingit by the Ministers in reaching their decision:
I conclude that it cannot be said that there was no foundation in
the evidence for the decision made by the Ministers. It can be said,
however, that there was inadequate (and perhaps no) assessment of
evidence produced by or on behalf of the Tlingits. In this respect, the
decision was unreasonable.60

After issuing the chambers judgment of June 28, 2000 quashing the Certiﬁcate, Justice Kirkpatrick also issued a judgment of direction on July
27, 2000 ordering that the reconsideration of the Environmental Assessment Report and Recommendations follow speciﬁc steps. She ordered
that the Project Committee be reconvened and provided with the Courtʼ’s
reasons for decision, and that the Committee re-familiarize themselves
with the issues. She further ordered that the Project Committee would
meet to, “discuss and meaningfully address the concerns of the Taku
River Tlingit First Nation regarding the Tulsequah Chief Mine access
road and its impacts.”61 A revised draft recommendations report was to
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be developed and circulated for comment, followed by a ﬁnal report
(also to be circulated for comment), and ﬁnally the revised recommendations report would be referred to the Ministers for decision.
2. British Columbia Court of Appeal – Justice Rowles (Justice
Southin in Dissent)
After the Chambers decision was handed down on June 28, 2000, a
full two years after the provision of the initial Project Certiﬁcate, the
British Columbia EAO and the proponent Redfern appealed the decision
to the BCCA in September 2001.62 In the interim between the Chambers
decision and the hearing at the BCCA, the parties agreed not to act on the
order of Justice Kirkpatrick and await the outcome of the appeal.63
On appeal, the Court held two to one in favour of upholding the
quashing of the Certiﬁcate. In dissent, Justice Southin embarks on a
long discussion of why, in her opinion, the Court below was in error in
ﬁnding the decision of the Ministers was made unreasonably. However,
much of her justiﬁcation for such a stance is derived through analogizing the First Nation to a municipality. As a point of administrative law,
Justice Southin states:
[I]t is right to consider these issues as if the objector was not
Aboriginal but was a ʻ‘municipality in the vicinityʼ’…who objected
to this mine and all its works on the ground that, in the opinion of
the inhabitants, the economic beneﬁts from a mine were less than
the economic beneﬁts from a nascent tourism industry which would
not ﬂourish, in their opinion, if the wilderness were invaded by
monstrous trucks transporting ore to Atlin.64

Such a foundation for the substantive reasoning relating to the main issue on appeal and cross-appeal (whether as a point of administrative law
the Supreme Court erred in its determination of the powers and duties of
ministers under the BCEAA) is fundamentally ﬂawed. Justice Southin removed the constitutional issues (the obligation to consult First Nations
under section 35) from the key underlying issue of whether the consultation, as it was done and then reported to the Ministers in the form of
62
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the Recommendations Report, was in keeping with the objectives and
requirements for a neutral, clear process under the BCEAA. Ultimately,
Justice Southin opines that the actions of the British Columbia Government cannot be construed as bias or a lack of neutrality:
[W]hat happened in early 1998 bears a very different construction
[from issuing a decision in a way that was not open, neutral or
accountable]. This process had gone on and on at very considerable
expense. It was clear that nothing short of changing the route of
the road from the mine to Atlin would satisfy the Tlingit. They had
made their points. The majority did not accept them. The executive
director and the chairman of the committee had a duty…to bring
the matter to an end and put the issue before the Ministers for their
determination.65

This reasoning neglects to recognize the point the TRTFN had made from
the outset: it is not that development within their region is unacceptable
per se, but that without devoting the resources to developing a land use
plan, settling land claims, acquiring baseline population data for species
in the area, and for researching the potential scope of impact, rather than
merely deferring to concepts of mitigation down the road, the British
Columbia Government was not in fact exercising an open, neutral and
accountable process that gave equal weight to sustainability and economics considerations. The fact that Justice Southinʼ’s rationale harks
back to the issue of economics for Redfern further emphasizes that the
bias toward economic factors is pervasive throughout Canadian policy
and judicial treatment of Aboriginal concerns.
Justice Southin also takes a perspective on the constitutional issue
of section 35 rights that does not appear to fully consider the scope of
what those rights may entail. While willing to concede that the TRTFN
have some sort of rights in northwestern British Columbia, this concession stops short of recognizing those rights as having any supremacy or
effect on the outcome of ministerial decisions on environmental assessments. Nor is Justice Southin prepared to consider whether the existence of section 35 requires governments to actively pursue resolution
of those rights prior to or concurrent with allowing substantial development within the areas at issue.
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Ultimately, Justice Southin appears to liken section 35 rights to a
right to voice an opinion, stating, “the right to be heard, whether in this
or any other process, and no matter how great the issue, is not a right
to victory.”66 Such comments only serve to illuminate the need for a
clearer concept of meaningful consultation. If the combined effect of the
BCEAA, CEAA and section 35 is to provide nothing more than an ability to
present objections to development proposals, sustainability objectives
are unlikely to be met and duties to consult resemble a one-sided process of information dissemination. There are, and always will be, some
projects which should be approved, but likewise, there are those which
should be rejected or delayed until more is known. If rejection or delay
is beyond the contemplation of government agencies, the neutrality of
the review process is compromised for the parties who participate in the
process in good faith, expecting that their concerns will be addressed.
The majority decision at the BCCA took a more holistic approach to
the Tulsequah Chief dispute, framing the issue as whether Justice Kirkpatrick erred in holding that the Ministers of the Crown were obliged
to take into account the constitutional protection afforded to Aboriginal rights by section 35 when determining whether to issue the Project
Approval Certiﬁcate prior to the Tlingits having established any Aboriginal rights or title in relation to the area of the Tulsequah Chief Mine
Project.67 Justice Rowles held that the obligation to consider Aboriginal
rights under section 35 existed for the Crown under a legislative scheme
such as the BCEAA and CEAA, even where no such rights have been established by a First Nation. It is this issue, framed in this way, which is now
before the Supreme Court of Canada.
The Appeal Court accepted the argument that where all experts
within an assessment process have recognized that there is reliance by
a First Nation on a system of land use, “merely identifying the problem
is insufﬁcient to meet the requirements of the EAA in that it does not address solutions to the problem.”68 Speciﬁcally, the Court stated that Aboriginal rights may not be infringed by Crown-sanctioned activities,69
and that arguments in which the constitutional or ﬁduciary obligation to
66
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consult only arises on the determination of Aboriginal rights, “is wholly
inconsistent” with Sparrow and Van der Peet.70
There were also arguments raised by the Crown with respect to the
severance of the issue of the assertion of section 35 rights by the TRTFN.
The Crown proposed that as the TRTFN had agreed to the severance of
the determination of their land claim from the issue of the Tulsequah
Project, there was no foundation on which the Chambers Judge could
have considered the assertion of Aboriginal rights with respect to the
consultations and duties on the Crown throughout the Tulsequah Chief
Environmental Review. The Court noted that in this respect, the holding
of the SCC in R. v. Sparrow provides some guidance:
Section 35(1) suggests that while regulation affecting Aboriginal
rights is not precluded, such regulation must be enacted according to
a valid objective…By giving Aboriginal rights constitutional status
and priority, Parliament and the provinces have sanctioned challenges
to social and economic policy objectives embodied in legislation
to the extent that Aboriginal rights are affected…The extent of
legislative or regulatory impact on an existing Aboriginal right may
be scrutinized so as to ensure recognition and afﬁrmation.71

The question, as Justice Rowles saw it, was not whether the Chambers
Judge should have considered the assertion of Aboriginal rights, but
whether the concerns raised by the TRTFN had been addressed in substance with respect to the timing and scope of development of Redfernʼ’s
mineral rights.72 Further, Justice Rowles found that the reasoning of the
lower Court was clear and was supported by both the facts and jurisprudence.
Ultimately, the British Columbia Court of Appeal recognized that
“the Tlingits were willing to participate in [the EA process] in an apparent effort to have their needs accommodated, but…the Certiﬁcate…was
issued without their concerns having been met.”73 Thus, the BCCA upheld
the lower Courtʼ’s ruling, though the Court dispensed with the requirement to refer the Recommendations Report back to the Project Committee.
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Upon receipt of the Court of Appeal ruling, the British Columbia
Government appealed the ruling to the Supreme Court of Canada on the
issue of the duty to consult prior to determination of the existence of
Aboriginal or treaty rights for a First Nation. The matter is set for hearing in March of 2004. However, the question, as framed by the Crown,
only partially addresses the concerns likely to be raised at that hearing
on cross-appeal by the TRTFN. What needs to be established, concurrently with a judgment on the obligation to consult, is what meaningful
consultation truly means.

VI. THE COST OF MINING AND THE COST OF OBLIGATIONS
1. Environmental Legacies: What is Past is Not Yet Over
In the assessment that took place in respect of the Tulsequah Chief
Mine, neither the concerns regarding the road nor the initial assertion
of Aboriginal rights were rebutted by the proponent or the government.
Rather, the government and the proponent appeared to take these concerns under advisement; and yet they did not act upon them. While it is
reasonable that there are instances where concerns may not be sufﬁcient
to refuse certiﬁcation to a project, in the case at hand there were obvious gaps in the information on which decisions were based.74 The Court
recognized that members of the Project Committee assisted in developing mitigation measures for potential impacts.75 Instances such as these
do not reﬂect a process that is inherently neutral, but instead a process
which, as an end goal, will certify a project to go ahead. Added to this
balance shift in favour of the proponent was the Recommendations Report itself, wherein the EAO suggested that key issues such as wildlife
impacts, decommissioning of the road, habitat depletion and regional
land use planning were all potential adverse effects for which mitigation
measures could be thoroughly developed at a later date.
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The shortsightedness of such a recommendation is evidenced by
numerous other mining developments where the concern for having
clear mitigation measures are overlooked due to the pressures exerted
on governments to create a “friendly climate” for development.76 Ultimately, the rush to mine may result in incredible costs to the jurisdiction that permits the development to go through. The Yukon Territory is
struggling with several such examples: the Anvil Range Mine at Faro
currently has a clean-up bill of over one hundred million dollars; and
the cost of the Cantung Mine on the North West Territories-Yukon border may also become a public burden in the near future. In the North
West Territories, the Giant Mine near Yellowknife may cost anywhere
between seventy and nine hundred million dollars, depending on the
difﬁculty in managing the arsenic contamination.77 These sites were developed at a time when mine controls were fewer; yet all were also allowed to continue operations without remediation once the extent of the
contamination was revealed.
A more recent example of a lack of government foresight, in the
context of CEAA, is the B.Y.G. Mt. Nansen Mine near Carmacks, Yukon.78 Poised to spill cyanide tailings water into feeder streams of the
Yukon River, a primary source of water for much of the territory and
one of North Americaʼ’s major salmon bearing rivers, the B.Y.G. site,
abandoned in 1999 when the company went into receivership, has cost
the federal and territorial governments one point eight to two point two
million dollars annually in interim remediation costs. The ﬁnal clean up
of the site is estimated at over six million dollars, which will be borne
by Canadian taxpayers.79 At the time when the mine was developed it
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was billed as crucial to the continuance of mining in the territory.80 It
stands now as an example of poor planning, unreasonable deference
to proponent assessments, and a lack of accountability throughout all
phases of the project.
2. Voiseyʼ’s Bay and the Mackenzie Valley Pipeline: Timing and
Sustainability
In contrast to projects such as B.Y.G. and the British Columbia Governmentʼ’s handling of the Tulsequah Chief case, there are Canadian examples of meaningful consultation such as Voiseyʼ’s Bay in Labrador
and the Mackenzie Valley pipeline project in the Northwest Territories.
Both these projects were proposed several years ago, at times when First
Nations in the respective regions were not prepared, had not completed
land claims, and held concerns about the sustainability of the region if
the project went ahead. While the speciﬁc facts of each proposal differed, the message sent by the Innu of Labrador and the Dene of the
MacKenzie Valley was, on ﬁrst consultation, that they were opposed to
the project without more information and stability for their nations.
Such stability was created through the settling of land claims, the
institution of self-government, and a place of equality within the process of mine development.81 With these factors in place, both the MacKenzie Valley Pipeline and the Voiseyʼ’s Bay Nickel Project are in the
initial stages of implementation. While there is, and likely always will
be, some opposition to these projects, they are based on concrete research, clear data with respect to wildlife populations, and anticipated
impacts with clear plans for the mitigation of these impacts.82 The two
80
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projects stand as examples of initiatives which have been accepted by
those directly impacted, at a time when the communities and the people
involved had a greater capacity to participate in the projects and to absorb the changes the development would bring.83

VII. THE NEED FOR OUR NATION TO COMMIT TO
SUSTAINABILITY
In 1977 Thomas Berger proposed a new way to deal with First Nations
in the context of development within their traditional territories. He
spent months collecting testimonies, often through interpreters, of how
the people of the North perceived the impacts of development on their
Nations and their way of life. The answers received clearly indicated
that many Aboriginal communities were not ready for the changes such
development would bring, and there were too many outstanding issues
of land and self-government to consider development at that point.
Since Berger undertook the MacKenzie Pipeline Inquiry much has
changed, but more has remained the same. The Canadian Constitution
has enshrined the rights of Aboriginals, but courts are still attempting to
articulate what the scope of those rights may be. Aboriginals in the territories have settled claims with the Canadian Government, and many
First Nations communities are now able to act with better certainty with
respect to development proposals that may be put forth. Yet, many other
First Nations, like the Taku River Tlingit, have yet to have their section
35 rights recognized or have land claims settled with the British Columbia or federal governments. This lack of certainty creates a climate
in which issues of sustainability can never be fully addressed, nor can
companies hope to provide methods of mitigation that will satisfy the
need for certainty that a First Nation may express.
It is possible in the Tulsequah Chief case that the concerns of the
Tlingits are capable of being entirely mitigated. However, whether this
is the case may never be clear because the Certiﬁcate was issued in a
manner that breached the elements of good faith necessary to determine
what positions all parties brought to the table. Without good faith in the
83
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process, parties to a dispute tend to polarize their stances in order to
effect the best outcome for their position. In this case, once good faith
was no longer present, the TRTFN moved toward litigation of the issue.
That litigation is not over, and it would appear that the TRTFN, Redfern,
and the B.C. EAO will be unable to resolve the question of sustainability
until a court has determined the scope and duty of consultation within
this process.
This is unfortunate because the proponent entered into the Environmental Review with what was clearly good faith in the assessment
process.84 While the scope of the project did not meet the sustainability
assessment that the Tlingit required to provide their endorsement, the
process was not at that point ﬂawed; nor, was it ﬂawed after the EAO contracted a sustainability assessment separate to that of the proponent. The
ﬂaw in the assessment process occurred when the collaborative aspects
of the Committee were halted, and the recommendations report was
submitted—absent discussion of sustainability and absent discussion of
the concerns of the TRTFN. This indicated that the government was going through the motions of consultation, but its meaning had been lost.
The project would go ahead, regardless of opposition. The question of
sustainability—of the Tlingits or the region itself, was no longer one
that the government wanted answered in relation to the EA for the mine.
This did a disservice to the proponent, in that Redfern is now party to
the legal battle between the TRTFN and the British Columbia Government
in which issues larger than one mine have been raised. It also did a disservice to the TRTFN, in that the question of their land claim has become
so closely intertwined with the Redfern Mine that other aspects of their
assertion of Aboriginal rights may be lost on grounds other than the
strength of their claim. The Canadian public are also ill-served by the
legal wrangling, given that they will bear the cost of a decade of assessments and litigation—a cost which could outweigh the proﬁts Canadians would see from the mine.
Currently in Canada we have an Environmental Assessment Process
which could, theoretically, provide an excellent analysis of the potential
impacts and beneﬁts of a development project. From that analysis, determinations could be made on whether a project ought to go ahead. But
this is far from the reality borne out by the experiences of Redfern and
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the Taku River Tlingit. The British Columbia Government, by all appearances, committed to ensure that the development went ahead long
before the assessment was completed. Some would say the assessment
never was complete, regardless of the position of the B.C. EAO.
With continuing examples of the poor application of principles of
sustainability, such as the case of the Tulsequah Chief Mine, it is clear
that the attitude of governments must change. It is harmful to industry,
groups committed to principles of sustainability, and to the people of
Canada to continue to see the CEAA and provincial assessment acts as
simply approval processes and not as opportunities to evaluate whether
a project really is in the best interests of Canadians. If we continue to
approve projects without due consideration of the principles of sustainability, there will be more incidents like the Tulsequah Chief Mine—
where the proponent, the government and opponents of the project are
locked in a legal battle which may never provide a satisfactory answer
to whether this mine should go ahead. Even bleaker is the potential for
more situations like Mt. Nansen and the Giant Mine, where the proponents are long gone and the taxpayers bear the burden of cleaning up a
disaster which should never have occurred.
There is a clear need for communities that will be affected by development to be able to accommodate the changes that development
will bring. Further, development must elevate rather than detract from
a communityʼ’s overall sustainability. These were the ﬁndings of the
Berger Inquiry, almost three decades ago. Principles of sustainability
are now clearly mandated by federal and provincial legislation. Where
sustainability is not in evidence, the burden rests on the government to
maintain a position of neutrality which was intended to be a part of the
assessment process. Without government neutrality, these matters will
spend years in court, and uncertainty will continue to reign for industry,
communities and First Nations affected by the proposed development.
While a position of neutrality may, in some circumstances, require the
delay or rejection of a project until questions of sustainability are answered, the cost of taking such a position is one our nation must bear.

